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I. Introduction
Article 122 of the Louisiana Mineral Code implies in every mineral
lease an obligation upon the mineral lessee to act as a reasonably prudent
operator. La. R.S. 31:122. According to the legislative comments, this
broad obligation includes the obligation to exercise reasonable diligence
to secure a market for minerals that have been produced or are capable of
being produced in paying quantities. The Legislature enacted the code
effective as of January 1, 1975, when lessees marketed natural gas, the
commodity on which this paper focuses, in a very different manner than
today. The code itself grew out of the pre-existing jurisprudence that, in
some cases, dates back to the early 1900s.
The Federal Power Commission ("FPC") regulated the maximum
price of natural gas sold into interstate natural gas pipeline systems in
1975 when the Louisiana Mineral Code was enacted. At that time, it was
acting pursuant to its authority under the Natural Gas Act of 1938, as
interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Phillips in 1954. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") did not yet exist. In
1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act abolished FPC and
created FERC. Initially, FERC regulated prices under the pricing provi-
sions of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. But changes in both statu-
tory law and regulatory orders fundamentally altered the transportation
and purchase and sale of natural gas in interstate pipelines in the United
States. In 1985 and 1987, FERC issued Open Access Rule Orders 436
and 500, whose purpose was to encourage pipelines to offer open access,
non-discriminatory transportation services so end users could contract
directly with producers for gas supply. In 1989, Congress passed the
Natural Gas Wellhead Decontrol Act allowing FERC regulation of pro-
ducer sales of natural gas to be eliminated gradually until full decontrol
in 1993. On April 9, 1992, FERC issued the Final Order 636, requiring
pipelines to unbundle their sales services from their transportation ser-
vices and to provide open access transportation service that is equal in
quality for all gas supplies whether purchased from the pipeline or some
other supplier. In a very short amount of time, Congress and FERC de-
regulated natural gas prices and unbundled the role of transporter and
purchaser.
One result of the unbundling process is that the buyers of natural
gas have changed. As a natural outgrowth of the process, the interstate
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pipelines withdrew from the traditional gas purchase or "merchant" func-
tion in the late-1990's, and divested of the related wellhead gathering
functions which were no longer necessary for their longline transporta-
tion business. Independent and major gas producers assumed the role of
gas purchaser, as well as various affiliated and independent marketing
companies, which sold gas in the production area directly to the existing
holders of pipeline transportation capacity: the local distributors, indus-
trial consumers and retail marketing companies. Those new marketing
entities, however, generally chose to purchase in bulk on mainline pipe-
lines and at the tailgate of large processing plants. The primary market
outlet for wellhead gathering and sales were left to the independent pro-
ducer and newly created gathering companies, as the "first purchaser" of
the commodity. Those entities had to perform the aggregation and mar-
keting functions that used to be handled by interstate pipelines in the old
bundled world.
With the :.ragmentation of the industry that ensued from the unbun-
dling process, various financial instruments were soon developed to
separate and reallocate various risks among the participants. As with
other commodities such as wheat, corn, copper and pork bellies, func-
tional fragmentation led to standardization of transportation and sales'
contracts, which gave rise to common aggregation and pricing locations
across the cour.try and the emergence of index pricing and basis differen-
tials. Today, producers are participants in a much more complex industry
made up of the physical markets for natural gas, the financial markets for
natural gas and the futures markets for natural gas.
Ironically, some of the trends in the downstream industry, and the
infant midstream industry and markets to which it gave birth, are incon-
gruous with trerds in the upstream industry. At the same time transporta-
tion and sale contracts are being standardized, many lessors are adding
riders to the old printed form mineral lease governing the relationship
between lessor and lessee designed to transfer all of the risks and costs of
operations downstream of the wellhead to the lessee and fundamentally
change the meaning of a royalty and a lessee's duty to market. At the
same time pipeline capacity -is tight and quality specifications are vigor-
ously enforced, higher prices for natural gas, combined with technologi-
cal advancements in exploration, drilling, completion and stimulation,
have producers drilling for deeper and generally poorer quality natural
gas. At the same time that unregulated midstream companies begin to use
their power to extract more revenue from producers, most producers are
drilling wells in mature basins and generally finding fewer recoverable
reserves and lower profits margins.
I The North American Energy Standards Board ("NAESB") and the Gas Industry
Standards Board "GISB" publish form Natural Gas Purchase And Sale Agreements that
are commonly used by buyers and sellers of natural gas.
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There are few Louisiana court cases interpreting the lessee's implied
obligation to market, and the jurisprudence that does exist, like the code
itself, largely predates the sea changes in the marketing of natural gas
that have occurred over the last two decades. A lawyer advising a lessor
or lessee in Louisiana has a body of statutory and jurisprudential author-
ity from which to make arguments concerning a lessor's duty to market,
but would have to limit opinion letters about many specific cases with
the caveat that the law is not clear on the particular question at issue.
Businesses desire certainty and do not want to be the "guinea pigs."
Producers lobby state legislatures in natural gas producing states to "fill
in the gaps," and royalty owners respond with a sophisticated lobbying
effort of their own. There is a rare convergence of lobbying efforts by the
National Association of Royalty Owners ("NARO") and the Independent
Petroleum Association of America ("IPAA") to regulate gathering and
intrastate pipelines that may gain traction, but modifying the relationship
of the lessor and lessee under the Louisiana Mineral Code is unlikely in
Louisiana. The lessee's implied obligation to act as a reasonably prudent
operator under the Louisiana Mineral Code, like any good statutory law
in a civil law system, is a general principle of the law that is broad
enough to be applied or extended by analogy to specific cases that its
drafters could not have envisioned. In our opinion, the commentators,
litigators and jurists of this state, not the Legislature, will clarify how the
law applies to many specific cases. This paper explores how mineral les-
sees in Louisiana may use the physical, futures and financial markets for
natural gas, as well as gathering issues that arise before the point of sale.
Mr. Leland Horton's portion of this presentation puts those issues in the
context of the statutory and jurisprudential authority governing the rela-
tionship between mineral lessor and lessee. We may raise more questions
than answers and we advocate more of a case by case analysis than a
bright line rule. But we believe that this is a fertile area of the law that
deserves discussion and debate.
II. Gathering and Transportation
A. Gathering and Interconnection
One basic reason that "market value" at the wellhead is difficult to
ascertain is because the physical market for natural gas is generally not at
the wellhead. Rather, mineral lessees typically sell natural gas down-
stream of the wellhead in pipelines or at hubs, a hub being a point where
several pipelines or storage facilities connect. The wellhead may be lo-
cated a long distance from any pipeline. Even a well located near a pipe-
line has no market unless it is connected to that pipeline and has capacity
and a buyer on that line.
A simple example illustrates some of the obstacles a producer faces
in getting its gas sold. Assume that a producer drills and completes a
wildcat well. For the sake of simplicity, assume the well is drilled on a
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lease basis on lands covered by a single mineral lease owned by a single
mineral lessor. To satisfy all of the LSU fans here, we will refer to this
hypothetical producer/mineral lessee as "Tiger Production Co." or "Ti-
ger" for short. The nearest pipeline to Tiger's well is a 30 inch interstate
transmission line located approximately two miles from the wellsite.
There are no existing taps on this transmission line in the vicinity of the
well. In order to sell natural gas produced from the well, Tiger will have
to lay a two-mile gathering line and pay to hot tap into the transmission
line. The cost of the gathering line (pipe, right of way, labor) is
$300,000, and the cost of the hot tap and related facilities is $200,000.
Tiger, or any other reasonably prudent operator, may or may not
want to spend these capital costs to secure a market, depending on a
number of variables, principally on the productive capabilities of the
well. If the well is capable of being a prolific producer, then a reasonably
prudent operator would spend these capital costs to get natural gas pro-
duced from it to a market and it is Tiger's duty to do so. However, what
if the well will only be a marginal producer? What if the proceeds from
the anticipated sale of natural gas from the well into that pipeline would
be sufficient to cover operating costs, making the well technically capa-
ble of producing in paying quantities, but would not be sufficient to re-
coup the capital costs for the gathering line and tap? The answer is that a
mineral lessee does not have a duty to spend capital costs to secure a
market for minerals, even for a well capable of covering operating costs,
if it does not have a reasonable expectation of recouping its capital costs.
A more difficut: issue arises if the proceeds from the anticipated sale of
natural gas from the well into that pipeline would likely cover operating
costs and recoup capital costs, but would not make much if any profit.
Most mineral lessees would take the position that they do not have an
obligation to swap dollars. They do not know on the front end the precise
volume of recoverable natural gas reserves they expect to produce from
the well or the commodity price they will receive for those reserves.
They should beir no duty to spend capital costs to secure a market for
minerals, even if capable of producing in paying quantities, unless they
have a reasonable expectation of recovering those capital costs plus some
profit commensirate with the risk that they are taking. Quantifying the
risk is a more difficult matter.
A related issue is whether the mineral lessor bears a share of these
capital costs to construct the gathering line and tap. The very definition
of a royalty is a share of production free of the costs of production. But
under a traditional "market value at the well" or "proceeds" royalty
clause, royalty is valued at the well by working back from downstream
sales. A mineral lessee accomplishes this valuation by deducting post
production costs from the downstream sales price. The rationale is that
costs subsequen: to production generally increase the value of the prod-
uct and must be "worked back" or "netted back" from the downstream
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sales price to obtain the true value at the well. Under this approach, a
mineral lessee with a "market value at the well" or "proceeds" royalty
clause may deduct the reasonable costs to transport the product from the
well to a pipeline and to tap into that pipeline.2
There are various methods by which a mineral lessee deducts capital
costs from its mineral lessor's royalty. If the capital costs were $500,000
and the well only makes $100,000 per month after severance taxes, then
it would take five months to recover these costs if the mineral lessee de-
ducted 100% of the royalty share of these capital costs from the lessor's
royalty. During that period of time, the mineral lessor would receive no
net royalty. More commonly, mineral lessees amortize these capital costs
over a period of time, such as the shorter of the expected life of the
equipment or well or field. In this example, if the well had a life expec-
tancy of three years, then the mineral lessee may deduct from proceeds
from the sale of natural gas attributable to the mineral lessor's royalty
that owner's royalty share of $13,888.88 per month being the total
amount amortized over 36 months. But if the well declines during that
three-year period to generate less than $13,888.88 per month in gross
revenue after severance taxes, then the mineral lessee again has the prac-
tical problem that the lessor is not receiving any royalties despite the
good legal theory supporting its position. An alternative that avoids this
pitfall is to charge a fee measured in cents per MCF. Thus, if the well
had estimated recoverable reserves of 2 BCF of natural gas, then the
mineral lessee may deduct 25 cents per MCF for a gathering charge
($500,000/2,000,000 MCF). Regardless of the approach used, the risk of
amortizing over too long a period of time is borne by the lessee because
he has no means of recovering costs out of the lessor's royalty if the well
depletes or reaches its economic limit before the three-year or other am-
ortization period is reached.
An aggressive mineral lessor may argue that having paid for its
share of the capital costs to build the gathering line and tap into the
transmission line, it now owns an interest in the equipment. The retort is
that the mineral lessor never paid its share of these capital costs; instead,
it was paid its royalty share. That royalty share, however, did not have a
market value at the well and thus had to be valued by taking into account
post production costs.
The legal relationship between the mineral lessor and mineral lessee
can become more tenuous once the mineral lessee has recovered its capi-
tal costs to construct the gathering line and tap. An aggressive mineral
lessee may continue deducting costs from its mineral lessor's royalty on
2 Whether Louisiana continues to follow this approach, as it did in Merritt v. South-
western Elec. Power Co., 499 So.2d 210 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986), after the Supreme
Court's decision in Frey v. Amoco Production Company, 603 So.2d 166 (La. 1992), is
discussed in more detail in Leland Horton's portion of this presentation.
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ground that the recovery of capital costs are not the issue. The issue is
what is the mineral lessor entitled to, and the answer is that it is only en-
titled to be paid based on market value at the wellhead. If the gas is being
sold downstream of the wellhead, then gathering fees must be worked
back out of a downstream price to ascertain the true value at the well-
head. Some mineral lessees may even gather gas in the same gathering
line from other leases for a fee. Pretty soon, the mineral lessee is profit-
ing from its gathering line. Not only is it profiting from that gathering
line, but it owns many other gathering lines from which it is also generat-
ing revenue. The mineral lessee decides that if it sells those gathering
assets to an affi..iated company that is not subject to any mineral leases.
Mineral lessors knee jerk response is often to add pages and pages of
riders to their mineral lease prohibiting companies affiliated with the les-
see from gathering or marketing natural gas produced from the well
which, for reasons discussed below, may not be in their best interest ei-
ther.
B. Quality Specifications
Another reason that "market value" at the well is difficult to ascer-
tain is because gas produced at the wellhead is often not of marketable
quality. Assume, for instance, that Tiger has laid the gathering line and
tapped into the t.-ansmission line. Tiger now has secured a market, right?
Maybe. Maybe not. Most Interconnect Agreements with interstate pipe-
lines contain language that provides as follows:
Interconnecting Party agrees to deliver gas in accordance with the
Pipeline's FERC Gas Tariff. Pipeline's FERC Gas Tariff gas speci-
fications as currently effective are attached as Exhibit "A." Pipeline
reserves the right to refuse to accept totally, or in part, gas not fully
in compliance with the GQ&M Sections and/or not interchangeable
with Pipeline's standard gas composition.
The gas delivered by Interconnecting Party at the Interconnect Point
shall be at the varying pressures that exist in Pipeline's line from
time to time, but in no event in excess of Pipeline's maximum al-
lowable operating pressure. Interconnecting Party agrees that in the
event compression is required or pressure reducing equipment is re-
quired to facilitate delivery by Interconnecting Party into Pipeline's
line, Interconnecting Party shall be responsible, at its expense, to in-
stall, own, operate, and maintain such facilities.
In this case, assume that the natural gas produced from the well is
not entirely made up of methane and that its quality does not conform to
the quality specifications under the pipeline company's tariff in three
ways: (1) CO2 exceeds the limit; (2) water saturation exceeds the limit;
and (3) hydrocarbon dewpoint exceeds the limit. In order to deliver natu-
.ral gas produced from the well into the transmission line, the producer
must purchase or lease an amine unit to bring the CO2 into spec, a dehy-
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dration unit to extract H20 from the natural gas and a JT Plant or Refrig-
eration Plant to knock out natural gas liquids from the natural gas. Let's
further assume that the operating pressure on the transmission line is 950
psi, and the pressure of natural gas at the outlet of the JT Plant is low. So
the producer must also purchase or lease a compressor to compress the
natural gas to pipeline pressure. In some cases, the wellhead pressure is
so low that produced gas must be compressed both before and after treat-
ing and processing.
The same issue discussed above arises concerning whether the min-
eral lessee may deduct any of these post production costs from the min-
eral lessor's royalty. But assume that the mineral lease in question con-
tains a "market value at the well" royalty clause together with a rider
providing the mineral lessee shall not deduct post production costs from
the value of the lessor's royalty. One approach to this dilemma is the
path followed in Heritage Resources, Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d
118 (Tex. 1996). In that case, the Texas Supreme Court held that the "no
deductions" language is "surplusage as a matter of law" because one
cannot determine the market value at the well when the point of sale is
downstream without using the work-back method.
Assume here that Tiger is unsure whether a Louisiana court would
follow the Heritage Resources, Inc. case, and decides that if it cannot
pass a share of these costs on to its mineral lessor, then it is not going to
sell its gas at the pipeline. Rather, it will enter into a contract with a mid-
stream company that buys the gas at the wellhead. The midstream com-
pany will spend all of the capital costs to tap into the line, lay the gather-
ing line to the well, and install surface production equipment to make the
wellhead gas of sufficient quality and pressure to deliver into the trans-
mission line. The midstream company offers a price for the gas at the
wellhead based on an index price less a certain number of dollars per
mmBtu. The price approximates what the lessee would have obtained
had he sold the gas at the same delivery point in the transmission line,
less his expected fuel loss and consumption and gathering, treating, de-
hydrating, processing and compression costs, and less a profit margin
that the midstream company builds into the deal for itself commensurate
with the costs and risks it bears. Further, the midstream company re-
quires the lessee to furnish financial guarantees in the form of a dedica-
tion of reserves and a $500,000 letter of credit securing the principal ob-
ligation to deliver the reserves. The lessee solicits and obtains bids from
various third party midstream companies to purchase the gas at the well-
head in this manner and chooses the best bid.
Now there is no need to work back because the natural gas is being
sold at the price that third parties are ready, willing and able to pay at the
well. The mineral lessor and mineral lessee both get the market value at
the wellhead.
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Assume a :lightly different factual scenario. In particular, assume
that Tiger Production Co. solicits the bids from the third party midstream
companies, but instead of awarding them the job, it awards the job to his
own affiliated company, Tiger Marketing Co., on the same terms and
conditions. The mere fact that Tiger Marketing is affiliated with Tiger
Production does not make the transaction a sham. Indeed, the transaction
appears to be arm's length in that Tiger Marketing is merely performing
under terms and conditions that Tiger Production negotiated with third
parties. Regardless, as discussed below with regard to marketing affili-
ates in the physical sales context, mineral lessors will, as a practical mat-
ter, apply a microscope to a transaction in which an affiliate is involved
to a much greater degree than a third party.
C. Transportation Agreements
1. Capacity Limitations.
Let's go back to our original scenario. Assume that Tiger's mineral
lease contains a "market value at the well" royalty clause and it does not
contain a "no deductions" rider. Tiger decides to gather, treat, dehydrate,
compress and ex-tract natural gas liquids from the wellhead gas on its
own and not use a third party or affiliated company. Tiger enters into an
Interconnect Agreement with the pipeline company to tap into the 30"
transmission line. Once the gas has been gathered to the interconnect
point, made to conform to quality specifications and is at the pipeline's
operating pressure, Tiger has finally secured a market, right? Again the
answer is maybe or maybe not. Most Interconnect Agreements with in-
terstate pipelines contain language as follows reminding the mineral les-
see that taping into the pipeline does not necessarily constitute securing a
market:
Availability of capacity and capacity allocations on Pipeline's sys-
tem are governed by the terms and conditions of its FERC Gas Tar-
iff and Service Agreements authorized thereunder. By this Agree-
ment Pipeline is not assuring or guaranteeing that capacity shall be
available in its transmission system to transport gas from Intercon-
necting Party's Interconnect Point..
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, it is
fully undersi:ood by Interconnecting Party that Pipeline's Transpor-
tation Agreement must first be entered into between Pipeline and In-
terconnecting Party and gas nominated thereunder, or gas must be
nominated under a Transportation Agreement between Pipeline and
. a third party before any gas may be received or delivered to the In-
terconnect Point.
A combination of the emergence of new sources of supply, such as
the Bossier and Barnett shale trends in East Texas, and a decade or more
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of limited investment in pipeline infrastructure has created capacity prob-
lems in some areas for producers. The importation of liquefied natural
gas or LNG's to the Louisiana gulf coast may exacerbate the problem
both from a volume and quality perspective. Many pipeline companies
have announced or are actually implementing expansion projects ranging
from increasing capacity on existing lines, system extensions, construc-
tion of laterals from existing systems, conversion of oil pipelines to natu-
ral gas pipelines or construction of entirely new natural gas pipeline sys-
tems. In the meantime, it is not unheard of for a producer without firm
transportation capacity to be shut in or curtailed from time to time.
Does the mineral lessee's obligation to exercise reasonable diligence
to secure a market for natural gas include an obligation to obtain firm
transportation capacity? In practice, many mineral lessees, particularly
small independents, will not actually transport natural gas downstream of
the interconnect point. Instead, they will enter into a purchase and sale
agreement with a shipper that has an existing Transportation Agreement
with firm or interruptible capacity on that line with the point of delivery
being the interconnect point where the mineral lessee's gathering line
intersects and taps into the pipeline company's transmission line. Alter-
natively, the mineral lessee may enter into an agency agreement with a
marketing company that pools natural gas from that producer and others
on that pipeline, transports the collective gas downstream under a Trans-
portation Agreement with the pipeline company (spreading the financial
risks that a firm Transportation Agreement introduces) and sells it on
their behalf to end users or other buyers. A more sophisticated seller may
sometimes sell at the interconnect point and sometimes downstream, or
may sell some volume at each point during the same time period, de-
pending on capacity, basis and other variables.
In any event, regardless of how the mineral lessee actually markets
its natural gas, there is again a cost to securing a market. If the mineral
lessee actually enters into a Transportation Agreement with the pipeline
company, then the payment will take the form of a reservation charge to
reserve capacity on that line and a transportation fee to transport the gas
from the interconnect point to its point of sale downstream, among other
costs. On the other hand, if the mineral lessee sells its gas to a shipper on
that line, then that shipper is paying those same charges and fees to the
pipeline company and will certainly pass them on, and then some, to the
mineral lessee. And, of course, those agents that pool natural gas on be-
half of producers do not work for free. In the words of a wise Bankruptcy
Court judge in the Western District of Louisiana, "you've got to pay to
play." However, as discussed below with respect to the physical sales of
natural gas in the spot market, there is often more value downstream than
at the interconnect point.
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2. Ovher Issues Before the Point of Sale
It can be questionable whether other costs associated with marketing
natural gas before the point of sale are deductible from the mineral les-
sor's royalty. For instance, who bears the loss of natural gas that is con-
sumed as fuel depends on both the type of lease at issue and under what
circumstances the gas is consumed. Many Bath forms and other mineral
leases commonly used in Louisiana allow the mineral lessee to consume
natural gas free of any royalty obligation as fuel in connection with pro-
duction facilities on the leased premises or lands pooled therewith. More
sophisticated leases, in contrast, require payment of royalties of all gas
produced and sared or "utilized." Thus, in our hypothetical example, if
Tiger set up its compressor on the leased premises and used wellhead
natural gas to fuel the compressor, then under most leases Tiger would
not have to pay royalty on the portion of the natural gas produced from
the well that it used to fuel the compressor. It may use that natural gas as
fuel free of any royalty obligation. If, on the other hand, Tiger com-
pressed natural gas at the interconnect point two miles from the wellsite,
then Tiger would have to pay royalty on the portion of the natural gas
consumed. However, even if it owes royalty on natural gas consumed as
fuel off the leased premises, Tiger could still argue that the costs of that
fuel could be worked back out of the price. In other words, Tiger loses
the argument on volume, but wins it on price. Tiger would pay the min-
eral lessor for the total volume produced from the well, including natural
gas consumed as fuel off premises, but it would pay the mineral lessor
the price after deducting the cost of that fuel.
It is not jus,: Tiger who may consume natural gas as fuel off the
leased premises. Most Transportation Agreements provide that the ship-
per must reimburse the pipeline company for the quantity of gas required
for fuel, company use and unaccounted for associated with the transpor-
tation service thereunder in accordance with the pipeline company's tar-
iff. The analysis here is the same as if Tiger is consuming the fuel. Tiger
should pay the royalty owner based on the volume produced from the
wellhead but, in calculating the price paid, may deduct the fuel retained
as a post producti n cost that enhances the value of the product.
Closely related to the.issue of consumption is that of loss. Most In-
terconnect Agreements provide in this regard that "[i]n the event of a line
loss or leak upst::eam of the Interconnect Point, Interconnecting Party
shall be responsible and liable for the gas loss." Line loss is like faith in
God. You know tiat it is real, but it is hard to convince someone who is
skeptical by nature. Mineral lessors are skeptical by nature. If they can-
not remember the days of "hot oil" themselves, their grandfathers told
them about it. Consequently, if volume is 3000 MCF at the wellhead, but
2700 MCF at the downstream sales point, they instinctively think that
somebody is stealng the 10% that is lost on the way to market.
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Another loss that sometimes confounds royalty owners is the loss
that occurs in the treatment process itself. If the natural gas contains CO2
in concentrations of 6%, and the pipeline company's quality specification
requires that CO2 not exceed 1%, then the volume of natural gas at the
outlet of the amine unit should be at least 5% less than the volume at the
inlet of the amine unit as a result of the treating process independent of
fuel consumption and line loss. If the CO2 or other byproducts that are
extracted in the treating process is worthless, then the mineral lessor can-
not complain if it is being paid based on the volume of gas at the outlet
of the amine unit.3 On the other hand, if natural gas liquids are being ex-
tracted, then as discussed below, the rights and obligations between the
mineral lessor and lessee can be more complicated.
Nominations with pipeline companies can give rise to other costs
before the point of sale. In particular, most Transportation Agreements
require the shipper to nominate the volumes of gas that it intends to
transport between points of delivery/receipt on the pipeline. Imbalance
charges can arise if the shipper fails to deliver the nominated quantity. Or
if the shipper delivers more quantity than it nominated, many pipelines
reserve the right to charge an overrun fee or penalty or even to vent ex-
cess natural gas.
D. Limitations on Costs Before the Point of Sale
There, are arguably more points of contention between mineral les-
sors and lessees prior to the point of sale in the area of gathering and
transportation than at the point of sale in the physical, financial and fu-
tures markets. But royalty owners and producers would do well to recog-
nize their common interests with regard to gathering and transportation.
Mineral lessors do not always improve their situation by littering the
mineral lease with riders that try to shift all of the post production costs
and risks to their lessees. Under the current industry structure, very few
independent marketing companies purchase gas at the wellhead. In addi-
tion, few fields can support economically two gathering systems, absent
a major new discovery. Accordingly, the producers often represent the
only competitive alternative to the independent gatherers for gathering
and marketing services. If a producer's marketing and gathering invest-
ment decisions carry too much risk of uncertainty regarding royalties,
then royalty owners will be unwittingly driving producers away from that
risk and toward the use of third party gatherers for wellhead sales and
gatherinig services. As illustrated in the Tiger Production Co. example
3 CO2 in small quantities is a nuisance but CO 2, Nitrogen and Helium can have sig-
nificant value when they are found in large quantities. Helium, for instance, sells at a
much higher price than methane, often $50 per MCF or more. Ironically, many operators
will purchase CO2 to energize their fracture stimulation of a natural gas producing sand-
stone, only to turn around and pay to extract CO2 from natural gas produced from the well
in order to bring it into quality specifications.
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above, mineral lessees can skillfully maneuver around such obstacles by
selling gas at the wellhead to a third party gathering company. But are
the parties better off? Although it has worked around the "no deductions"
clause in the mineral lease, Tiger has had to put up financial guarantees
and may also have to dedicate its acreage. The mineral lessor is getting
the market value at the well, for which it bargained, but it is effectively
paying post production costs which it thought it would not bear.
The long term consequences are more severe. The producer now has
fewer available cptions in getting its gas to market, and both the pro-
ducer and royalty owner will have to accept a lower netback wellhead
price for the commodity. Furthermore, both may realize lower prices be-
cause of fewer buyers at "pooling points" exiting a gathering system as
well as more balancing and penalty costs under a third party gathering
service. The costs, of course, become magnified because the gatherer,
with its installed facilities, gains market power after a field moves into
development and again as the field begins to decline. The legal relation-
ship between lessor and lessee does not limit what the gatherer can
charge in fees or pay for natural gas. Instead, its limits are more practical,
and essentially depend on the alternative markets. If there are no feasible
ones, particularly toward the end of the well's or field's productive life,
then it will increase its cut. After all, its only interest is making a profit
from the transaction. In short, the lessor is exposed to risks in this sce-
nario from which it would otherwise be protected due to the common
interest of the less or and lessee and the existing law governing their rela-
tionship protecting the lessor.
Mineral lessees, for their part, need to realize that they, unlike third
party gatherers, are limited by Article 122 of the Louisiana Mineral Code
if not the terms of the lease itself. I often hear producers complain about
how tough the state lease form is, but the following text from the state
form, in contrast 10 many leases that are entirely one-sided, strikes a via
media:
If Lessee delivers such gas at a point outside the field in which this
lease is situated, Lessee may deduct from the value of such gas a
reasonable sum for transportation from the field to the point of de-
livery by means of facilities belonging to an independent party, not
in excess of actual cost. If such transportation is by means of facili-
ties owned by one other than an independent party, Lessee may de-
duct the actual cost of such transportation, but only if such cost is no
greater than the fair value of the services performed; if actual cost is
greater than fair value, the fair value shall determine the amount to
be deducted. If such transportation is by means of any facilities
owned by Lessee, Lessee may deduct from the value of production a
reasonable sum for such services, computed as follows: the amount
deductible shall include only (1) the direct cost of operation and
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maintenance, including cost of labor, direct supervision, fuel, sup-
plies, ordinary repairs, and ad valorem taxes; and (2) depreciation of
the facility computed over the estimated life of the field.
Whether this language is included in the lease, is not some limitation im-
plied in law? Stated differently, would not a court analyzing whether a
mineral lessee has properly deducted post production costs from the min-
eral lessor's royalty under Article 122 inquire whether those costs were
actual, whether they were reasonable and whether they constitute a fair
value of the services performed?
If the enemy of my enemy is my friend, then royalty owners and
producers may actually unify over this issue. After all, post production
costs are a source of conflict when it is the mineral lessee that is deduct-
ing gathering and other fees from the mineral lessor's royalty, but they
are a source of unity when an unregulated, third party intrastate gathering
company charges both mineral lessor and mineral lessee such fees for
their services. NARO President Linn A. Willers summarized the opinion
of royalty owners on the subject provides as follows:
We must take action, now, to help preserve the integrity of natural
gas production, or the marketing system could be facing a meltdown
in the coming months and years. The proliferation of Master Lim-
ited Partnerships which creates virtual regional monopolies in the
pipeline gathering sector, coupled with relatively ineffective or non-
existent intrastate regulatory oversight, has resulted .in enormous
profits for a handful of companies at the expense of independent
producers without pipeline capabilities, royalty interest owners and
consumers of natural gas and its by-products. It is essential to the
health of our industry that NARO does its best to support a competi-
tive natural gas market and transparency in the area of contractual
transportation agreements.
Producers are waging the fight at FERC with regard to both onshore and
offshore gathering facilities. In comments submitted to FERC regarding
reassertion of jurisdiction over the gathering services of natural gas com-
pany affiliates, the IPAA argued on behalf of producers as follows with
regard to onshore gathering:
Unlike other commodities, it is not practical to move natural gas
from domestic wells to mainline transmission lines in any manner
other than through smaller diameter gathering lines. In the absence
of either federal or state regulation or other form of oversight, do-
mestic producers are held hostage to whatever rates the gathering
company wishes to charge. On the one hand, the price of the natural
gas commodity is set by the marketplace. On the other hand, the
mainline interstate transportation rates are set by the Commission in
recognition of the pipeline's monopoly power and the need to pro-
tect consumers from the exercise of this monopoly power. However,
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absent similar state regulatory protection, producers are caught in
the middle with no way to guarantee that they can recover these
gathering costs in the commodity sales price.
Absent federal legislation, FERC will likely not regulate onshore or
offshore gathering facilities because it lacks jurisdiction. See, e.g., Jupi-
ter Energy Corp. v. FERC, No. 05-61173, slip op. at 10 (5th Cir. Mar. 15
2007)(holding fat FERC must articulate reasons for dismissing the im-
port of non-jurisdictional physical factors and relevant non-physical fac-
tors in determining whether two natural gas pipelines located approxi-
mately ten miles offshore from Louisiana gather as opposed to transport
natural gas).
In recent comments on the subject, Commission Chairman Joseph
T. Kelliher stated as follows:
The Commission has tried a number of times to assert jurisdiction
over offshore gathering facilities to protect against undue preference
and the exercise of monopoly power, but has been repeatedly re-
buffed by 1he courts. We must accept the judgment of the courts.
Under curnmt law, offshore gathering is an unregulated monopoly.
That will remain the case unless and until the law changes.
Even if Congress wanted to change the law, its own power is limited by
the Constitution to interstate commerce. If policy changes are effected
legislatively, it i more likely that they occur at the state level where one
would think tha: the combined efforts of royalty owners and producers
would be formidable.
III. The Financial Markets
A. Spot Market
1. Natural Gas Purchase And Sale Agreements
Most produ:ers in Louisiana sell their natural gas production in the
spot market. A spot market in general is a market in which payment or
delivery is immediate. Black's Law Dictionary 984 (7 ed. 1999). In the
natural gas contcxt, it is sometimes called the "physical" or "cash" mar-
ket.
The purchase and sale of natural gas, like the transportation of natu-
ral gas, can be either on a firm or interruptible basis. Most purchase and
sale contracts allow for a combination of firm and interruptible sales.
Neither party may unilaterally interrupt its delivery or receipt of volumes
purchased and scld on a firm basis except as a result of an event of force
majeure. Volumes delivered on an interruptible basis, which are often
called "swing" volumes, are generally defined as those volumes exceed-
ing firm volumes. Although either party may freely interrupt its perform-
ance for swing volumes, that party may still be subject to nomination and
imbalance obligations under the purchase and sale agreement. Indeed, for
both swing and firm volumes, the seller generally bears imbalance
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charges arising out of its failure to deliver nominated volumes until the
buyer and transporter confirm changes in deliveries.
The NAESB and GISB forms are commonly used by buyers and
sellers alike to sell natural gas. The term of a natural gas purchase and
sale agreement can be and generally is longer than one month. However,
each transaction under that agreement is generally for a term of one
month. Although the daily cash market for natural gas is active, the ma-
jority of gas trading for a given month occurs during the last week of the
preceding month. This period of time is known in the industry as "bid
week." It is the last five business days of each month when producers
generally sell all of their available volumes of natural gas for the follow-
ing month in concert with the pipeline's requirements that all nomina-
tions for gas transportation be made at least three business days prior to
the first of a given month.
2. Pricing
The price of natural gas is no longer regulated. Instead, it is dictated
by what a buyer is ready, willing and able to pay and a seller is ready,
willing and able to accept in the marketplace. Like other commodities,
natural gas prices in the United States are influenced by supply and de-
mand. The factors affecting supply include domestic production, imports
of dry gas from Mexico and Canada and imports of LNG from overseas
and storage facilities. The weather and the economy, above all other fac-
tors, influence demand. The price of other commodities, such as crude oil
and coal, also influence demand, as many industrial and utility consum-
ers can change their source of fuel to use the cheapest fuel in the existing
marketplace.
In our hypothetical, Tiger's cash market is either at the well, if it
sells to the midstream company, or at the interconnect point where its
gathering line interconnects and taps into the pipeline company's trans-
mission line or some other point of sale downstream from that intercon-
nect point. It may be theoretically possible for a mineral lessee in Louisi-
ana to transport natural gas produced here all the way to Transco Zone 6
in New Jersey for distribution to New York, but it is not feasible. Ac-
cordingly, prices in general can be analyzed with reference to supply and
demand on a national basis, but index prices at a particular hub are also
greatly influenced by local or regional supply and demand factors.
Thus, one of the main factors affecting price is the location of the
delivery point. Prices are generally based on an index. Index prices are
intended to represent an average price of natural gas delivered to a hub or
other specific point on a pipeline at or during a specific period of time.
Henry Hub, a place near Erath, Louisiana where 13 major pipelines (in-
cluding Gulf South Pipeline, Southern Natural Gas, Natural Gas Pipeline
Co. of America, Texas Gas Transmission, Sabine Pipe Line, Columbia
Gulf Transmission, Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line, Trunkline Gas, Jef-
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ferson Island Pip(line and Acadian Gas) have receipt/delivery points, is
one of the most common indexes used for physical sales of natural gas in
Louisiana and, as discussed below, is also the delivery point for most
natural gas future:; contracts in North America.4
The term "basis" is sometimes used to describe the difference be-
tween the price of natural gas at different delivery points. It is also used
to describe the dxfference between the price of natural gas at different
times, such as the cash price less the future price.
The method of how index prices are collected, calculated and re-
ported is controversial. Platts, a division of the McGraw-Hill Companies,
is the publisher of Gas Daily and Inside FERC's Gas Market Report. It
collects detailed, transaction-level data from actual buyers and sellers.
For the daily price survey published in Gas Daily, market participants
must report each business day all fixed-price physical deals completed
prior to the NAESB nomination deadline for the next-day delivery in
North America. For the monthly bidweek price survey published in In-
side FERC's Gas Market Report, market participants report all fixed-
price physical deals negotiated during bidweek for delivery throughout
the next month. All transactions are listed individually and must specify
delivery point, price, volume, source, buy/sell indicator, trade date, start
flow date, end flow date, counterparty name and intermediary name
(broker or trading platform).'
Pricing can alsovi'y~ased on whether the volumes are sold on a
firm or interruptible'basis.'Firm volumes are generally based on prices
prior to the mdnth. of delivery. For instance, under a "trigger" firm con-
itract, the Seller notifies the Buyer of its desire to sell a certain quantity of
natural gas for a certain time period, generally the next month, at a cer-
ain execution price less a certain basis differential, and the Buyer at-
tempts to lock in those terms for that period of time by entering into off-
setting transaction in the marketplace. Under a "baseload" firm contract,
the Seller designates a firm baseload volume for the next month to be
priced at the Inside FERC's Gas Market Report first of the month Index
for the appropriate month of delivery under the heading Market Center
Spot Gas Prices, less a fixed basis differential. Swing volumes, in con-
trast, are priced at either the daily price for the day in which the gas is
delivered or the adithmetic average of all the daily prices for the given
As a matter of historical interest with legal implications, Henry Hub was shut-in
between approximately September 23, 2005 and October 4, 2005 as a result of Hurricane
Rita. Physical deliveries and receipts at that delivery point ceased. Purchasers and sellers
whose contracts were lied to the Henry Hub index looked for an alternative index price or
basket of indices to replace their agreed upon index price. NYMEX declared an event of
force majeure on September 23, 2005 for both September and October 2005 natural gas
futures contract delive .y obligations. For a brief but important period of time, Hurricane
Rita inflicted its dama ie to natural gas markets, removing both a key trading center and
national benchmark for prices.
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month in which the gas is delivered, less a fixed basis differential. In a
purchase and sale agreement with tiered pricing for firm and interruptible
volumes, the first gas through the meter is deemed the triggered firm
volumes, subsequent deliveries are deemed to be baseload firm volumes
and all other deliveries are deemed interruptible or swing volumes.
3. First of the Month Versus Daily Price
The exact price owed a mineral lessor and the extent to which the
mineral lessee is obligated to get the best possible price can be compli-
cated even in the cash market. Additional facts about Tiger, our hypo-
thetical mineral lessee, illustrate some of the issues. Assume that Tiger
sells natural gas, either baseloading or swinging volumes, to a third party
buyer at the interconnect point based on an index price less a basis dif-
ferential. Assume further that Tiger had an extraordinary year in picking
whether to baseload or swing monthly volumes. In those months when
the first of the month price exceeded the daily price or average daily
price, Tiger sold all of its volume on a baseload basis, whereas in those
months when the daily price or average daily price exceeded the first of
the month price, Tiger sold all of its volume on a swing basis. Assume
further for the sake of convenience that Tiger produced exactly 100,000
mmBtu per month or 1.2 BCF (assuming 1000 btu/cf) for the entire 12
month time period of 2006 attributable to this single mineral lease. The
difference between the first of the month price and the daily average
price for Henry Hub varies but is almost always material. The smallest
difference during 2006 was 15 cents per mmBtu, whereas the largest dif-
ference was $2.69 per mmBtu. Before severance tax and royalty, Tiger
would have grossed over $1.1 million more during 2006 due to its ex-
traordinary skill or luck marketing natural gas produced from one lease
by picking either the first of the month price or the daily average price.
If the lessor's royalty under the mineral lease is 25%, is the royalty
owner entitled to his 25% share of that profit? The volume and quality of
the natural gas delivered has not changed. The delivery point is the same.
The index used for pricing is even the same. The only difference was that
the mineral lessee was extraordinarily good at choosing whether to
baseload or swing volumes sold in the cash market, and the difference
between first of the month and daily price even using the same index can
be dramatic.
From the lessee's perspective, the question centers upon whether the
lessor is bearing the same risk that the lessee bears. Changing the facts
illustrate the point. Now assume that Tiger is extraordinarily poor at
picking whether to baseload or swing. Instead of always picking the
more profitable choice, Tiger always picks the wrong choice for the same
time period. Thus, Tiger grosses $1.1 million less than it could have be-
cause of its poor choices. Has the mineral lessee breached its obligation
to get the best price obtainable by reasonable efforts? Does Tiger owe the
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mineral lessor the best price it could have obtained had it picked cor-
:rectly? If so, then it is heads the lessor wins and tails the lessee loses. It is
obviously impossible for any lessee to pick correctly all of the time.
Most lessors are hindered by a lack of information. They do not
subscribe to Gas Daily or Inside FERC's Gas Market Report and they are
not privy to the transactions into which their lessee is entering. But that
does not stop them from making the most out of the information that they
do have. A favorite technique is to compare checks from different operaz
tors in the same field. If one check for natural gas produced from the
field during January of 2006 is for a price close to $11.45/mmBtu and
another is for a price close to $8.76/mmBtu, then the mineral lessor will
assume the operator who paid the lower amount is taking advantage
when, in fact, they both represent "market" prices for the preferred
Hienry Hub index during that period of time.
4. Performing with Spot Gas Purchases
One way for the mineral lessee to exploit the differences between
first of the month and daily prices is to de-link the purchase and sale con-
tract from physical deliveries from this well. A modification of the as-
sumed facts with regard to our hypothetical mineral lessee, Tiger Produc-
tion Co., shows how this can be done. Assume that Tiger calls its natural
gas purchaser and baseloads 100,000 mmBtus attributable to the lease in
question for the month of January 2006 at a price of Henry Hub first of
the month index price less 25 cents or $11.20/mmBtu. After locking in
this first of the month price, however, Tiger's well is shut-in due to me-
chanical difficulties. In order to perform under its purchase and sale con-
tract, Tiger decide, to buy natural gas on the spot market and deliver that
gas to its purchaser. Tiger pays approximately $8.5 1/mmBtu to buy natu-
ral gas at this loca:ion using the average daily index price less the same
basis differential, but it sells the gas at a price of $11.20/mmBtu. Thus,
Tiger nets $2.69 per mmBtu multiplied by 100,000 mmBtu's oi
$269,000.
Tiger would cbviously argue that it does not owe its mineral lessee
any royalty on its profit from trading activities because it did not actually
sell any natural gas produced attributable to the lease.
But a small change in the assumed facts calls Tiger's argument into
question. Assume that instead of shutting in the well because of me-
chanical difficulties, Tiger shut in the well simply to profit from the
spread between the first of the month and daily prices without having to
produce its well and without having to share any of the proceeds with
royalty owners or severance tax authorities. As a result, the royalty
owner missed out on one of the highest priced months in recent history.
Now has Tiger broached its implied obligation to exercise reasonable
diligence to secure a market for its mineral lessee?
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Change only one fact in the hypothetical-the month of delivery-
and Tiger's position does not look so enviable. Assume that Tiger, like
any good gambler, decides that it has the knack for making money mar-
keting. At the end of September 2006, Tiger decides to baseload 100,000
mmBtus for delivery in October 2006 attributable to the mineral lease in
question at the same price of Henry Hub first of the month index price
less 25 cents. Tiger has to shut in its well again due to mechanical diffi-
culties. However, the difference between the first of the month and the
daily index price works against Tiger this month. Now, Tiger has to pur-
chase natural gas on the spot market at a price of $5.40/mmBtu to deliver
to its purchaser under its natural gas purchase and sale agreement for
which it only receives $3.95/mmBtu. Tiger has lost $145,000 on gas
marketing without even producing any gas. Producers who do not have
other means of making up for unforeseen dvents are generally quite cau-
tious in selling firm volumes for this reason: The market can work
against you.
A long term purchase and sale contract containing a fixed price with
an end user, such as a distribution company, electric utility or industrial
consumer, can give rise to these same issues between mineral lessor and
mineral lessee. The dollars involved, however, can become more signifi-
cant since both the volume of natural gas at issue and the variances be-
tween fixed prices and floating prices become more pronounced over
numerous months.
5. Price at Interconnect Point Versus Downstream Price
Significant variations in price can also occur depending on where
the delivery point is for the sale. A modification of our hypothetical deal-
ing with Tiger Production Co. illustrates the questions such variations
can create in the relationship between the mineral lessor and lessee. As-
sume that the interstate transmission line in which Tiger is delivering
natural gas connects two hubs each of which has its own published index
price. For simplicity, call these two fictitious hubs and index prices East
Tx and West Ms. The average basis, or difference of price between these
two hubs, is about 20 cents per mmBtu with the West Ms being generally
the preferred market. Assume Tiger taps into the transmission line in the
Western part of North Louisiana. If Tiger sells its gas at that interconnect
point, its contract price is East Tx index price less 10 cents per mmBtu. If
Tiger sells its gas downstream at the West Ms hub, it gets West Ms less
10 cents, but it pays 20 cents in transportation fees. Thus, during normal
time periods, Tiger has no incentive to do anything other than sell at the
interconnect point. However, during particular times of the year, the ba-
sis between the two hubs can increase to $1.00. During those periods of
time, when the pipeline has excess capacity, Tiger transports its gas
down the line for the 20 cent fee, sells it downstream of the interconnect
point at the West Ms hub and obtains a net price that is 80 cents higher.
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What does Tiger owe the mineral lessor? Stated differently, how far
downstream does a mineral lessor's royalty extend?
6. Marketing Fees and Affiliated Marketing Companies
The affiliated marketing company, like the midstream MLP, is a
feared and loathed bogeyman of mineral lessors. Like it or not, both enti-
ties provide a valuable role in today's unregulated marketplace. .How-
ever, as soon as some of the legitimate marketing techniques discussed
herein are employed by the mineral lessee's marketing affiliate instead of
a third party or the mineral lessee itself, the transaction is suddenly
clouded by suspicion.
Consider the following example. Assume that our mineral lessee,
Tiger Production Co., is not good at marketing. Tiger's president has a
good friend, thou oh, who specializes in marketing natural gas. The friend
charges a 2.5% marketing fee. The friend gets the same price that Tiger
would get on its own if it marketed its own production. Tiger rationalizes
that the 2.50/ marketing fee is less than the overhead it would have to
spend to establish a marketing department or affiliate and, in any event,
Tiger's president likes helping out his friend. There are some other in-
tangible benefits to using the marketing company. It sponsors an expense
paid trip for its customers every year to Augusta National to see the Mas-
ters.
In this light, Tiger is going to have a hard time justifying the 2.5%
marketing fee to its mineral lessor.5 But consider a few more intangibles.
The marketing company is very good at "customer service." This not
only includes trips and dinners and gifts, but also flexibility with delivery
obligations. Those months when Tiger has problems with its well and
cannot meet its nominations and firm delivery obligations, the marketing
company does not charge imbalance fees or require delivery. It makes up
the shortage fromr other supplies at no cost to Tiger. That would have
come in handy during our hypothetical above when Tiger baseloaded all
of its production for the month of October 2006. The marketing company
also has strong credit.6
Many small nor -operating working interest owners do not have enough volume to
justify taking their shz re of production in kind and marketing it themselves, but are faced
with the dilemma of signing a horribly one-sided marketing agreement that includes a
marketing fee for or te underbalanced under a gas balancing agreement. They generally
sign the agreement, not because the operator's marketing affiliate is earning the fee but
rather because they he ve no economic alternative. Their mineral lessor inherits the same
bad deal.
Enron painfully reminded many producers and royalty owners alike that creditwor-
thiness of natural gas purchasers is important. Purchasers take delivery of your natural
gas one month and do not pay for it until the next month or, if they are out of money the
next month, never.
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Still not convinced? Assume another fact, specifically, that the mar-
keting company pools gas from numerous producers delivering natural
gas into pipeline. Instead of marketing just Tiger's 100,000
mmBtu/month, the marketing company markets another 500,000
mmBtu/month of other producers' gas or a total of 600,000
mmBtu/month on that pipeline. The marketing company has reserved
firm transportation on that pipeline and has in place purchase and sale
contracts downstream with end users. By virtue of its market position,
the marketing company also gets a better price. Instead of being paid
based on the East Tx index price, the marketing company always gets
paid based on the West Ms index price. The net effect over a year's pe-
riod of time is to increase the value the mineral lessor and lessee obtain
by 5% gross or 2.5% after the marketing fee. Now has the marketing
company earned its marketing fee? Now does the lessor bear the 2.5%
marketing fee? Has the marketing company enhanced the value of the
gas?
Once you are convinced that the marketing company has earned its
fees, it just takes a change of one fact in the hypothetical to shift the per-
spective. Now assume that the purchaser is not a third party marketing
company but Tiger Production Co.'s own marketing affiliate, Tiger Mar-
keting Co. All other facts being the same, are not the lessor and lessee
better off having Tiger Marketing Co. market the production for them?
7. Natural Gas Liquids
Volatility in the relationship of the price of two different commodi-
ties, in this case dry gas and natural gas liquids, can also create issues
between the mineral lessor and lessee.7 For instance, assume that Tiger
negotiates with the pipeline company and obtains a waiver of the hydro-
carbon dewpoint quality specification. As a result, Tiger can continue to
extract natural gas liquids from the wellhead gas, selling the liquids in
the NGL market and the residue gas to a shipper on the pipeline. Alterna-
tively, now it can also bypass the JT Plant, deliver wet gas to the pipeline
and sell it all in the pipeline with higher mmBtu's per cubic foot. The
margin between the price of dry gas and natural gas liquids will dictate
which one Tiger chooses. When dry gas prices are more valuable, in rela-
tion to the price of natural gas liquids, then Tiger prefers to minimize
volume loss and sell as many mmBtu's as possible. Thus, it does not
7 The margin between the value of two different commodities, such as crude oil and
natural gas, can also be hedged or arbitraged using a spread option. One barrel of crude
oil has 6 times more heating value than one thousand cubic feet of natural gas on an
mmBtu basis, but it is not always valued that way in terms of dollars. Currently, natural
gas is undervalued, on an mmBtu basis, in relation to crude oil, but the margin between
the two changes daily. One way to arbitrage this margin is to take a long position on natu-
ral gas and a short position on crude oil betting that the price relationship between the
two must converge.
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process. On the other hand, when natural gas liquids are more valuable, it
sells as many gallc ns as it can extract from the wellhead gas.
If Tiger pays royalty to its mineral lessor on both liquid and residue
gas sales, then the mineral lessor has no complaints. But if Tiger sells its
wellhead gas to its marketing affiliate at a delivery point prior to the ex-
traction of natural gas liquids and is always paid and always pays based
on the price of natural gas, even when its affiliate is profiting down-
stream on the margin between prices of natural gas and natural gas liq-
uids, has Tiger breached its obligation to its mineral lessor?
B. Futures Market
1. The NYMEX Henry Hub Futures Contract
a. Introduction
People often ask me, "What are gas prices?" Sometimes there is not
a clear answer. To begin with, some people mean gasoline instead of
natural gas. Once you get the commodity straight, you then have to de-
cide whether they mean cash or future. If cash, then one question is
where? The price c in differ dramatically from hub to hub. Another ques-
tion is whether they mean the first of the month cash price or the daily
price or the daily average price, which, as illustrated above, can also dif-
fer dramatically. If on the other hand, they are inquiring about futures,
then to which delivery point and what delivery date are they referring.
Generally, when someone asks you "What are gas prices," or the press
reports on natural g is prices, they are referring to the New York Mercan-
tile Exchange ("NYMEX") futures contract for delivery at Henry Hub
for the following month.
A futures market is defined as a commodity exchange in which fu-
tures contracts are t::aded; a market for a trade (e.g., commodities futures
contracts and stock options) that is negotiated at the current price but
calls for delivery a: a future time. Black's Law Dictionary 983 (7 ed.
1999).
Natural gas futures have been traded on NYMEX since April 3,
1990. By far the most widely traded contract is the NYMEX Henry Hub
contract. Its point of delivery is the Henry Hub. Its popularity reflects the
liquidity of the underlying Gulf Coast market and its prominence in
North America as a price reference for physical transactions. All volume
originally was traded through "open outcry" on the NYMEX "Floor." In
2000, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange ("CME") launched the first elec-
tronic trading platform, called "Globex." The CME is now the exclusive
electronic trading services provider for NYMEX Energy and Metals, in-
cluding natural gas options and futures contracts. The rapid growth of
this trading platform has been remarkable. Now, almost 80% of the daily
volume of NYMEX natural gas options and futures contracts are traded
on Globex. If future look-alikes being traded over-the-counter via the
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swap markets and Intercontinental Exchange Inc.'s "ICE" electronic
trading platform are included, the NYMEX Floor's portion of the market
is now very small.
The only term to negotiate for a NYMEX futures contract is the
price. The quantity, quality, timing of delivery and delivery location are
all standard.
Futures contracts require that the buyer take delivery and that the
seller deliver the commodity at a certain date. Most parties, however,
never intend to actually make or take delivery. Instead, they take an off-
setting contract position with the exchange that closes out contracts.
b. Physical v. Financial Futures
There is a link between futures contracts and cash contracts. As
stated above, the term "basis" can refer not just to the difference between
cash prices at two different delivery points, but also to the difference be-
tween the cash and future price. The term "contango" refers to a market
in which the price of a commodity for future delivery is higher than the
spot price or a far future delivery price higher than a nearer future deliv-
ery. This is also referred to as a "normal" market, since the premium paid
for longer term delivery reflects the costs of holding the commodity for
future delivery, including a premium based on time and risk. "Backwar-
dation" is the opposite of contango. In a so-called "inverted market," the
price of a commodity for near term delivery is higher than the price for
long term delivery. There are different reasons why a market may be-
come inverted. However, consumers' preference to have the product
sooner rather than later generally indicates a perception of shortage in the
underlying commodity. By the same token, a market that is deeply in
contango may indicate a perception of supply surplus in the commodity.
Though most futures contracts are not settled through delivery, the
ability to settle it through delivery of the commodity ensures that futures
prices and cash prices are related. For instance, if the futures market be-
comes overvalued, traders can "short" the market by selling futures con-
tracts and delivering the physical commodity. On the other hand, if the
futures market becomes undervalued, traders can buy futures contracts
and accept deliveries of the commodity which they can resell at higher
spot market prices. The term "arbitrage" refers to the simultaneous buy-
ing and selling of identical commodities in different markets with the
hope of profiting from the price difference in those markets. The arbi-
trage between a physical market and a future market of an identical
commodity is sometimes called "time arbitrage."
c. Marking To Market
Another unique aspect of a NYMEX futures contract is that the ex-
change is the counterparty. Thus, there is a buyer or seller for every
transaction, but the exchange takes the opposing side of each transaction
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and assumes legal responsibility for satisfying contract provisions. The
exchange clearinghouse backs its guarantee with reserves accumulated
from the margin funds that traders are required to deposit in order to
open and maintain their positions.
The margin required to deposit in order to open a position is fixed
by the NYMEX and depends upon whether the customer is a member or
non-member and what month the future contract calls for delivery, with
non-members and nearer months generally requiring a larger margin. A
broker may require additional margin deposit for an individual customer.
Some brokers allow an investor to earn interest on the balance in a mar-
gin account, while others do not. However, just posting the initial margin
is not all that is required. Margin maintenance, which is somewhat lower
than (usually about 75% of) the initial margin, is also required. At the
end of each trading day, the customer's margin account is adjustedto
reflect the customer's gain or loss. This practice is referred to as "mark-
ing to market" th:- account. When the margin, defined as the net liquidat-
ing value plus non-cash deposits in a customer's account declines below
the maintenance margin requirement applicable to the open positions
carried in such account, then the broker carrying that account makes a
"margin call" to the customer, and the customer is required to restore the
account to the then prevailing initial margin requirement by the next
business day. If the customer does not provide the variation margin, the
broker closes out the position by selling the contract. The effect of mark-
ing to market is :hat a futures contract is settled daily rather than at its
delivery date. A futures contract is in effect closed out and rewritten at a
new price each day.
2. Use of Futures for Risk Management
A hedge is a transaction one enters into with the intent of offsetting
risk from another related transaction. In the commodities context, a
hedge is a transaction entered into for the purpose of protecting the value
of a commodity from adverse price movement by entering into an offset-
ting position in the same or a related commodity. There are two common
hedging objectives. One is to reduce the risk of unacceptably low returns
on capital employed. For instance, if the producer has borrowed capital
to purchase or develop an oil and gas asset, its lender often requires
hedging to ensure that the producer's returns are sufficient to meet its
repayment obliga:ions. The other common objective is to achieve the
highest risk-adjusted return on capital employed.
In theory, a rroducer can use NYMEX natural gas futures contracts
for physical deliveries. For instance, assume a producer produces 10,000
mmBtu per month. His point of delivery is Henry Hub, and the quality of
his natural gas complies with Sabine Pipeline Co. quality specifications.
In early December, the producer sells one natural gas physical future
contract for delivery in January at a price of $7.50 per mmBtu of the
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same quantity of gas at the same delivery point. By the time bid week
rolls around in late December, the cash price for delivery at Henry Hub is
down to $6.00. The producer decides to make a physical delivery of its
natural gas under the future contract and obtain the $7.50 per mmBtu
price.
In practice, most futures contracts are settled financially and not by
physical deliveries. For example, our hypothetical mineral lessee, Tiger
Production Co., would not likely deliver its gas at Henry Hub since its
well is located in Northwest Louisiana. Instead, if it held the $7.50 per
mmBtu January futures contract as cash prices declined to $6.00, it
would liquidate' the contract prior to the delivery date and pocket the
spread which should approximate $1.50 per mmBtu. Tiger may continue
to produce the well during January, but it sells natural gas produced from
the well at the lower cash prices.
In the extreme example in which the hypothetical producer actually
makes a physical delivery at Henry Hub, the mineral lessor may have a
claim to the higher futures price. In most cases, however, the futures con-
tract operates solely as synthetic hedge or a financial transaction, mean-
ing that the futures contract is not tied to physical delivery of natural gas.
In this example, Tiger's royalty owner would have no claims on profits
Tiger realized as a result of hedging, nor should it bear losses resulting
from Tiger's hedging.
C. Options Market
Options, like futures, are also traded on NYMEX. An option is the
right (but not the obligation) to buy or sell a given quantity of a commod-
ity at a fixed price within a specified time. Black's Law Dictionary 1121
(7 ed. 1999). A call is an option to buy a commodity (and require another
to sell) at a fixed price even if the market rises. Id. A put is an option to
sell a commodity (and require another to buy) at a fixed price even if the
market declines. Id. The term "spread" can mean different things in the
natural gas industry, but in this context refers to the difference between
the highest price a buyer is willing to pay (bid price) and the lowest price
at which a seller will sell (the asked price). Id. at 1411.
The definition of several key terms is required to understand how an
option works. First, there is the volume. Like the NYMEX Henry Hub
futures contract, an option on natural gas is typically measured in terms
.of 10,000 mmBtu per contract. Second, there is strike price or exercise
price. The strike price is the fixed price for which a commodity will be
8 Technically speaking, "unwind' is a term used in the swap market for the process
whereby a position or positions, created from a previous swap trade or series of swap
trades, is eliminated by entering trades in the equal and opposite direction of the previous
trade. The term "liquidate," on the other hand, refers to the process whereby a futures
position created from a previous trade or series of trades is eliminated by buying or sell-
ing the futures contracts in the equal and opposite direction of the position.
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bought or sold under an option contract if the option is exercised. Id. at
1207. Third, there is the premium, which is the amount paid to buy an
option. Id. at 1200. The buyer of an option also incurs transaction costs
in addition to the premium. Fourth and finally, there is the expiry date
which is the date on which the option expires or ceases to exist. Id. at
600.
The buyer of an option can do several things prior to its expiration.
First, it can attempt to sell the option. The options market, however, gen-
erally has less L:.quidity than the futures market, and just because one
wants to sell does not mean that there is a buyer that wants to buy. Sec-
ond, the buyer can exercise the option, meaning that it elects to execute
its right to either buy (call) or sell (put) the natural gas from or to the
seller at the strike price. By exercising the option, the buyer essentially
converts the option into a futures contract which it can settle by either
making a physical delivery or selling the futures contract in the futures
market where there is more liquidity. Third, the buyer of an option can
let the option expire worthless and lose its premium and transaction
costs. This is or.e of the appeals of options trading, namely, that the
buyer's risk is limited to its premium and transaction costs.
More optiors strategies exist than can possibly be covered in this
paper. The most basic involve the long call option, the long put option,
the short call option and the short put option. More complex options
strategies include the bull call spread, bull put spread, covered call, bear
put spread, long straddle, short straddle and long butterfly.9
One of the most common ways natural gas producers use options to
hedge commodity risk is to create a floor or ceiling, or to create both by
means of a collar or cost-free collar. A producer can place a floor on its
selling price by buying a put option, whereas a gas purchaser can place a
ceiling or cap on its purchase price by buying a call option. A collar is a
combination of a put option and a call option that has the effect of plac-
ing both a floor and a ceiling on the purchasing or selling price. For ex-
ample, a producer could place a floor and a ceiling on its selling price by
buying a put option and selling a call option with the same expiry date.
For a zero cost or cost free collar, the premiums for the purchase of the
put and the proceeds from the sale of the call cancel each other out,
meaning that ther: is no cost to the producer. A 10 cent collar gives the
Amaranth Advi:;ors, a hedge fund that lost approximately $6 billion in September
of 2006, was reported: y using a spread to go long on the March natural gas futures, while
shortinig the April futires, betting that natural gas prices historically rise during winter
amd fall after March, in the so-called "shoulder months" as demand for heating among
consumers declines. An uneventful hurricane season in the United States, however,
caused the March/Apiil 2007 natural gas spread to contract sharply, not widen, in Sep-
tember resulting in tremendous losses for Amaranth.
- 265 -
producer a higher floor and ceiling, but reflects a net premium cost to the
producer of 10 cents per unit of measurement.
In almost all cases, an option is purely a synthetic hedge which
should not positively or negatively affect the price that the mineral lessee
pays the mineral lessor. Theoretically, the owner of a put contract can
exercise the option and make a physical delivery under the futures con-
tract. As discussed above with regard to futures contracts, only in this
rare, but theoretically possible, case are the rights of the mineral lessor
potentially implicated.
D. Over-the-Counter Market
The types of contracts traded in the over-the-counter market
("OTC") are numerous and can include forward contracts, options and
swaps. Both an OTC forward contract and an exchange traded futures
contract are agreements to buy or sell a commodity at a certain time in
the future for a certain price. But, unlike futures contracts, forward con-
tracts are not traded on an exchange. Instead, they are private agreements
between two financial institutions or between a financial institution and
one of its corporate clients. They are typically negotiated by phone or by
computer. Forward contracts and others traded in this manner are com-
monly referred to as being traded "over-the-counter."
There are several benefits to the OTC market in comparison to the
futures market. First, while futures are standardized, some terms of for-
ward contracts, such as the delivery date and location, are negotiable be-
tween the parties. Because a party to a forward contract can negotiate the
delivery location, that party can reduce basis risk by assuring that the
terms of the forward contract more closely matches its physical market
positions. Second, the margin or collateral requirements may differ de-
pending on the private parties involved, but forward contracts also differ
from futures in that they are not marked to market daily. The buyer and
seller of a forward contract agree to settle up on the specified date of de-
livery. Third, most futures are settled up prior to delivery, whereas most
forward contracts reach maturity at which time the seller must deliver the
commodity or settle in cash. Fourth, most OTC contracts can be traded
both before and during trading hours and after the exchanges close.
There are also some detriments to the OTC market. To begin with,
because OTC contracts are between two private parties, each counter-
party is exposed to the credit risk of the opposite party. Furthermore,
there is generally less liquidity in the OTC market. Also, there is greater
enforcement through the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and
oversight through the National Futures Association of exchange traded
futures than OTC transactions.
One of the most common OTC transactions utilized in the natural
gas industry is a swap. A swap is an agreement between two parties to
exchange, at some future point, one product, either physical or financial,
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for another. In a simple example of a physical swap, suppose Tiger has a
long term contract with an industrial consumer in South Texas. Tiger's
natural gas wells in South Texas, however, have declined, and it no
longer has enough production to meet its contractual obligations to de-
liver. As a result, it seeks more natural gas in South Texas. At the same
time, Tiger is selling natural gas on the spot market in Northwest Louisi-
ana. Tiger calls its gas marketer who purchases natural gas at both points
of delivery. The gas marketer proposes to purchase natural gas in South
Texas and transfer it to Tiger in exchange for Tiger's North Louisiana
production. Tiger has effectively exchanged or swapped its natural gas in
Northwest Louisiana for natural gas in South Texas.
A physical swap, like a futures contract in which a physical delivery
occurs, may implicate the rights of mineral lessors because the transac-
tion is affecting the price that Tiger receives for its natural gas produced
in North Louisiana. Also like a futures contract, though, it is much more
common for producers to enter into financial swaps than physical swaps.
A financial swap is another type of derivative that obtains its value
from the price o: prices of one or more financial productions, such as an
index or a futuies contract. It involves the exchange of payments be-
tween two parties, one of which is at a fixed price at the time the swap is
entered into, and the other of which is floating. In a simple example of a
financial swap, assume that Tiger decides in early December that it de-
sires to sell its gas in the upcoming months of January and February for
no less than $6.0 per mmBtu. Its well is now making 3000 mmBtu/day.
A natural gas mirketer offers to purchase the gas on the spot market at
the interconnect point for an index-based price, Henry Hub less a fixed
basis differential. At the time of the offer in early December, that net
price is slightly greater than $6.00 per mmBtu but could change between
early December and the time the price is determined under the purchase
and sale agreement. Tiger has bills to pay and cannot make less than
$6.00 per mmBlu for the upcoming months of January and February.
Accordingly, it accepts the gas marketer's offer, but it also searches for a
swap counterparty willing to take the index price risk. Tiger finds an
OTC derivatives dealer that is willing to buy a fixed-for-floating swap.
The buyer of the swap agrees to pay a fixed price and will receive a
floating price. The seller of the swap, being Tiger in this example, re-
ceives a fixed price from the other party and pays a floating price to that
party. At the time the swap is entered into, the two payments are consid-
ered to be of equal value.
One of the most commonly traded natural gas fixed-float swaps are
futures look-alike swaps or futures swaps. They mirror the futures con-
tract itself, but at the expiration of the contract, they are settled finan-
cially. Since som: companies do not have actual futures trading accounts
set up with the futures exchanges, such OTC transactions provide them a
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way to participate in the price action of the futures market. Assume in
this case that the fixed price under the swap was $6.01 per mmBtu, while
the floating price - the index based average - ended up being $5.50 per
mmBtu. Tiger's accounting for its sales during the months of January
and February would be summarized as follows:
Payment To Tiger For Physical $5.50/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day x
59 days or $973,500
Swap Payment From Tiger ($5.50)/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day
x 59 days or ($973,500)
Swap Payment To Tiger $6.01/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day x
59 days or $1,063,770
Effective Result $6.01/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day x
59 days or $1,063,770
In this example, Tiger effectively protected itself from downward
price risk between early December and the delivery dates in January and
February by locking in the fixed price. This is another example of a syn-
thetic hedge which, since it is not based on physical deliveries, should
neither increase nor decrease the price paid the mineral lessor. Tiger
should pay based on the $5.50 per mmBtu index based price for physical
sales.
The problem with this hypothetical is the problem with many
hedges: It does not exactly mirror the physical conditions under which
Tiger is selling its gas. Tiger is not delivering its natural gas at Henry
Hub. Instead, it is selling natural gas at the pipeline interconnect point
between the East Tx. and Western Ms hubs. Although some marketers
may pay for physical gas at other delivery points based on a Henry Hub
index price less a larger basis differential, it is more common to sell at a
weaker index less a smaller basis differential that more accurate reflects
the point of delivery for the sale.
Assume that Tiger is being paid for its physical deliveries based on
an East Texas index price, not on a Henry Hub index price. Assume fur-
ther that the basis differential between the Henry Hub index price and the
East Tx index price at the time Tiger entered into the transaction in early
December was 20 cents. However, by the time that January and February
rolled around, that basis differential had grown to 50 cents. Tiger thus
netted 30 cents less for its physical sales based on the East Tx index price
than it had to pay for its swap payment based on the Henry Hub index
price. Now, Tiger's accounting for its sales during the months of January
and February would be summarized as follows:
Payment To Tiger For Physical $5.20/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day x
59 days or $920,400
Swap Payment From Tiger ($5.50)/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day
x 59 days or ($973,500)
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Swap Payme it To Tiger $6.01/mmBtu x 3,000 mmBtu/day x
59 days or $1,063,770
Effective Result $1,010,670
A basis swap is a derivative that seeks to protect against fluctuations
in basis differentials. Basis swaps are priced based on the prices of two
underlying financial products, an index price and a futures contract price.
The buyer of the basis swap agrees to pay a fixed price to the seller and
receive a floating payment from that party in return. The seller, again
being Tiger in th:.s example, receives a fixed price from the other party
and pays a floating price. The fixed price is the basis differential at the
time the transaction is entered. The floating price component is the index
for a particular location. Again, at the time the swap is entered into, the
two payments are considered to be of equal value.
A basis swar has broader application than this example. In essence,
any party that enters into a fixed-price physical transaction at any loca-
tion other than a futures contract delivery point, and subsequently enters
into a futures swep or futures contract to hedge that fixed-price risk, is
exposed to basis risk and can use a basis swap to hedge against that risk.
NYMEX makes available for trading a series of basis swap futures con-
tracts that are quated as price differentials between approximately 30
natural gas pricing points and Henry Hub. The basis contracts trade in
units of 2,500 mmBtu on the NYMEX ClearPort trading platform.
1[V. Conclusion
A common theme of the factual examples used in this paper is that
each one illustrates marketing opportunities or challenges resulting from
volatility and particularly basis volatility, that is, the difference between
the price of natural gas at different delivery points or at different delivery
dates. Another source of volatility that gives rise to the same type of is-
sues is volatility between the price of two different, but related com-
modities, such as tatural gas and natural gas liquids.
Except in rare circumstances, transactions that the mineral lessee
enters into in the iutures, options and OTC markets are purely financial
and have no impact on the relationship between mineral lessor and les-
see. Even in the physical market, the mineral lessor is, in large part,
along for the ride. Unless it has reserved the right to take in kind, it has
no say in how its share of production is marketed, except to the extent
that it chooses its Lessee. Moreover, the mineral lessor faces a Hobson's
choice in choosing its lessee. If it leases to a small independent, it will
probably get the same price that the lessee itself receives, but it may not
be a very good price. A small lessee may prefer paying a third party
gatherer, because it does not have enough production on its own to jus-
tify the costs of its own gathering system. Even if it builds its own gath-
ering system, a small lessee will generally sell at the interconnect point,
not to an end user or at a downstream hub, because it does not have
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enough production to secure firm transportation. Even selling at the in-
terconnect point, a small lessee cannot afford to baseload firm volumes,
because it does not have excess supply to make up its delivery obliga-
tions if its well goes down. On the other hand, if a mineral lessor leases
to a large independent or major, then its gas may be sold on better terms,
but that higher netback price may not flow through to the lessor.
The upshot is that there is value to aggregating natural gas. In order
to take advantage of the volatility in basis, to realize full market values or
even to participate in certain markets, a mineral lessee must have reli-
able, sufficient volumes of natural gas. As a result, the nearest market
index price less post production costs to get to that market may be a good
indication of market value at the well, but a bright line rule either in fa-
vor of mineral lessors (a mineral lessor is always due the nearest spot
market index price) or in favor of mineral lessees (payment of the nearest
spot market price less post production costs is per se a reasonable price)
is not practical. Some mineral lessees simply are not in a position to ob-
tain that nearest market index price for themselves or their lessor. More-
over, those lessees that are in a position to realize market values often
enjoy that position because of bargaining power that they bring to the
table independent of the lease. What constitutes reasonable diligence to
secure a market for natural gas and what the mineral lessee owes the
mineral lessor as royalty should depend upon the facts and circum-
stances. Producers do not like the uncertainty of a facts and circum-
stances rule, but it encourages them to at least consider the interests of
their lessors. Although sometimes impractical, a simple meeting with the
lessor in some cases can resolve uncertainties about gathering and mar-
keting. As discussed in detail in Leland Horton's portion of this presenta-
tion, such an approach is consistent with the "bargained-for exchange
test" followed by Louisiana courts.
- CCCQ
- 270 -
